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during unemployment depress goods demand because of a precautionary savings motive. 
Lower goods demand reduces job vacancies and the job ﬁnding rate producing an ampli- 
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 1. Introduction 
The U.S. and many other Western economies have still not fully recovered from the Great Recession, the longest and
deepest recession since the 1930’s. The U.S. labor market outcomes during the Great Recession have been particularly grave
involving not only a persistent rise in the level of unemployment, but also a surge in the share of longer-term unemployed
workers. This paper proposes a macroeconomic theory that combines frictions in goods, labor and ﬁnancial markets in which
such labor market weaknesses are ampliﬁed. We apply the theory to the Great Recession and argue that the ampliﬁcation
mechanism helps in understanding the severity of the Great Recession. 
We consider a model in which workers face job loss risk during employment and uncertain job ﬁnding prospects during
unemployment. Workers cannot purchase unemployment insurance contracts and rely on government-provided unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and private savings for consumption smoothing. This is embedded in a macro model with monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms that face nominal rigidities in price setting and inﬂexible real wages. 1 Nominal rigidities is a simple way
of allowing ﬂuctuations in aggregate demand to impact on equilibrium allocations while the assumption of rigid wages is
motivated by the lack of a decline in real wages in the U.S. during the Great Recession.  We are grateful for insightful comments from the editor (Ricardo Reis) and the referees of this journal, Marco Bassetto, Jeff Campbell, Edouard Challe, 
Mariacristina de Nardi, Marty Eichenbaum, Christian Hellwig, Per Krusell, Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, Jose-Victor Rios-Rull and seminar participants at nu- 
merous conferences and workshops. 
 Financial support from the ADEMU (H2020, No. 649396 ) project and from the ESRC Centre for Macroeconomics is gratefully acknowledged. 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: m.ravn@ucl.ac.uk (M.O. Ravn). 
1 For our quantitative evaluation, we only require that real wages are downward rigid. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.07.003 
0304-3932/© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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 The labor market is modelled in a Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides style matching framework extended with heterogene-
ity in workers’ search eﬃciency that emerge either upon job loss (unobserved heterogeneity) or during an unemployment
spell (negative duration dependence). 2 This aspect allows us to address the surge in longer-term unemployment but matters
also for job uncertainty. The model is closed by introducing a ﬁscal authority that provides unemployment beneﬁts and a
monetary authority that sets the short-term nominal interest rate. We allow for aggregate shocks to the job separation rate
and to the probability that unemployed workers have low search eﬃciency. 
In this setting, changes in the risk of job loss or in the probability of ﬁnding a new job during unemployment impact
on aggregate demand through employed workers’ precautionary savings. Worsening labor market conditions can contract 
goods demand by far more than the income loss of the workers that actually suffer a job loss. 3 Due to nominal rigidities,
declining goods demand leads ﬁrms to post fewer vacancies reducing the job ﬁnding rate which further contracts goods
demand thereby producing ampliﬁcation. We simulate a calibrated version of the model in response to the short burst in
the rate of inﬂow to unemployment observed in the U.S. at the onset of the Great Recession and to shocks to the risk of
becoming a low search eﬃcient unemployed worker. The model produces a rise in the unemployment rate and a drop in
vacancy postings very similar to their empirical counterparts during the Great Recession. The model is also consistent with
the movements along and the outward shift of the Beveridge curve observed in the Great Recession. 
It is the combination of frictions in ﬁnancial, goods and labor markets that generates ampliﬁcation. Insurance against
idiosyncratic risk neutralizes the ampliﬁcation mechanism by removing the incentive to engage in precautionary savings
against idiosyncratic risk. Absent nominal rigidities, price adjustments eliminate the transmission of shocks to labor de-
mand. Fully ﬂexible wages moderate the ampliﬁcation mechanism unless workers have little bargaining power. Aggressive
monetary policy can also neutralize the ampliﬁcation mechanism by inducing price ﬂexibility. We also show that the local
indeterminacy region of the parameter space is large and depends crucially on agents’ risk aversion. 
We are not the ﬁrst to study the impact of unemployment risks on the economy. Krusell and Smith (1999) and Krusell
et al. (2009) examine the impact of short-term and long-term unemployment risks with self-insurance. Challe and Ragot
(2015) and Challe et al. (2016) study like us the impact of precautionary savings in an incomplete markets setting. Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2015) examine an incomplete markets setting with nominal rigidities focusing upon the impact of tightening
borrowing constraints. den Haan et al. (2017) examine the importance of portfolio choices for the impact of unemployment
risk in an incomplete markets setting. Gornemann et al. (2012) and McKay and Reis (2016) both study incomplete markets
models with labor and goods market frictions but focus upon very different questions from us. Gornemann et al. (2012) ex-
amine the distributional effects of monetary policy when agents face unemployment risk while McKay and Reis (2016) focus
upon the impact of automatic ﬁscal stabilizers. 
Our analysis also relates to the literature on ‘uncertainty shocks’ that has followed Bloom (2009) . However, whilst much
of the existing literature has emphasized the impact of changes in second moments of aggregate shocks, we stress the effects
of changes in the ﬁrst moments of job separation and job ﬁnding rates. An interesting aspect of this is that uncertainty is
partially endogenous and countercyclical. 4 
2. The great recession and the labor market 
The Great Recession lasted 18 months (December 2007–June 2009), the longest since the Great Depression, and it trig-
gered a major deterioration of U.S. labor market conditions. The unemployment rate rose from 4.7% in July 2007 to 10% by
October 2009, and subsequently remained stubbornly high, see Fig. 1 . The increase in unemployment witnessed during this
episode is large but not out of line with previous U.S. recessions, but compared to other recessions, the rise in unemploy-
ment was very persistent. 
The ﬂows in and out of unemployment provide useful insights into the determinants of unemployment. Fig. 1 also il-
lustrates the average instantaneous unemployment outﬂow rate, p 
f 
t = m t u t−1 , and the average unemployment inﬂow rate,
p l t = e t n t−1 ( u t is the level of unemployment, n t the stock of employment, m t the ﬂow of workers from unemployment to 
employment, and e t the number of job separations). 
5 The initial rise in unemployment was triggered by a rapid increase
in the unemployment inﬂow rate in the period from early 2008 to late 2009 but its persistence derives from a large and
stubborn decline in the unemployment outﬂow rate which dropped dramatically during 2009 and has since struggled to
recover. 
Longer term unemployment surged during the Great Recession. In the postwar sample prior to the Great Recession, the
share of longer term unemployed displays moderately countercyclical movements peaking at 26% during the early 1980’s
recession, see Fig. 2 . During the Great Recession instead, this indicator surged from 17.5% in August 2007 to 45.3% in April
2010 and remains high, see also Rothstein (2011) and Wiczer (2013) . The rise in longer term unemployment is related both2 Ahn and Hamilton (2016) ) and Hornstein (2011) investigate the importance of duration dependence and heterogeneity for the increase in unemploy- 
ment during the Great Recession. 
3 Carroll and Dunn (1997) and Carroll et al. (2004) also stress the impact of labor market uncertainties on demand due to precautionary savings. In our 
model, the equilibrium impact on savings is zero but precautionary savings matter for the real interest rates and for the equilibrium allocation. 
4 Leduc and Liu (2016) provide time-series evidence that changes in ‘uncertainty’ impact on aggregate demand and argue that labor market risks are 
important. 
5 All data were obtained from the Current Population Study (CPS) apart from e t which we got from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Fig. 1. Unemployment and job ﬂows in the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to deteriorating job ﬁnding prospects and to increased heterogeneity amongst the unemployed (or to measurement error).
To see this, suppose that the job ﬁnding rate is constant within a month and that all unemployed face the same probability
of ﬁnding a job. This induces the law of motion for the average duration of unemployment, d t : 
d t = 
(
1 − p f t 
)
( d t−1 + 1 ) u t−1 
u t 
+ p l t 
n t−1 
u t 
. (1)
Close to the non-stochastic steady-state d = 1 / p f where p f is the long-run value of the job ﬁnding rate. Fig. 2 shows av-
erage U.S. unemployment duration together with the inverse of the average instantaneous job ﬁnding rate and the estimate
of average unemployment duration derived from (1). The inverse job ﬁnding rate tracks the BLS estimate of the average
unemployment duration very closely until the Great Recession. From late 2007, however, the BLS estimate of unemployment
duration rises approximately twice as much as the inverse of the job ﬁnding rate. The estimated unemployment duration
implied by (1) is essentially identical to the inverse of the job ﬁnding rate. Hence, there is evidence of increased heterogene-
ity in searchers’ job ﬁnding prospects or of measurement error (in either duration or job ﬂows data). We will concentrate
on the ﬁrst of these. 
Fig. 2 also illustrates the Beveridge curve (using CPS estimates of unemployment and JOLTS estimates of the number of
vacancies). We discriminate between the pre-Great Recession period and the period from 2007:12. During the early parts
of the recession, unemployment approximately doubled while the number of vacancies fell by around 50% producing a
striking movement down the Beveridge curve. From late 2009, however, the Beveridge curve shifts outwards, indicating a
less eﬃcient matching between workers looking for employment and ﬁrms looking for new hires, see also Barlevy (2011) . 
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Fig. 2. Labor market indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In summary, the persistent decline in the job ﬁnding rate is key for understanding the large and persistent increase in
unemployment during the Great Recession, the increase in average unemployment duration is related to heterogeneity in
job ﬁnding prospects, and there have been substantial movements along the Beveridge curve followed by an outward shift
in this relationship. 
3. Model 
Consider a heterogenous agents model with frictions in ﬁnancial, labor and goods markets. 
Workers. There is a continuum of mass 1 of risk averse and inﬁnitely lived workers indexed by i ∈ (0, 1) who maximize the
expected present value of their utility streams. A worker is either employed or unemployed. Employed workers (indexed by
r i,t = n ) earn a real wage w t but lose their current jobs with probability ρt ∈ [0, 1]. Unemployed workers search for jobs and
receive unemployment beneﬁts ξ < w t . There are two types of unemployed workers who differ in their search eﬃciency and
therefore in their job ﬁnding probabilities, ηr , t . High search eﬃciency unemployed workers ( r i,t = s ) face shorter expected
unemployment spells than unemployed workers with low search eﬃciency ( r i,t = l), 0 ≤ηl , t ≤ηs , t ≤1. Upon job loss, a newly
unemployed worker enters the high (low) search eﬃciency pool with probability ϕs , t ∈ [0, 1] ( ϕ l,t = 1 − ϕ s,t ). During an
unemployment spell type s unemployed workers may transit to type l , an event that occurs with probability ω t ∈ [0, 1].
The model therefore includes two sources of heterogeneity in job ﬁnding rates, ‘unobserved heterogeneity’ and ‘negative
duration dependence.’ Both imply that workers who have been unemployed for longer periods on average have lower job
ﬁnding rates than newly unemployed workers. 
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the aggregate labor market shocks are realized. After this, un-
employed workers and ﬁrms with job vacancies match and new employment relationships are established. This is followed
by production and consumption. At the end of the period, job separations are effectuated. Thus, em ployed workers face
idiosyncratic uncertainty about the identity of job losers and about their search eﬃciency should they lose their jobs. 
Workers cannot purchase unemployment insurance contracts and smooth consumption through government provided 
unemployment beneﬁts and through self-insurance by saving in a riskless nominal bond, b h 
i,t 
. Workers maximize utility
subject to a borrowing constraint and sequence of budget constraints: 
b h i,t ≥ b min , t ≥ 0 , (2) 
c i,t + b h i,t = n i,t w t + ( 1 − n i,t ) ξ + 
R t−1 
1 + πt b 
h 
i,t−1 , t ≥ 0 . (3) 
n indicates the household’s employment state: 
n i,t = 
{
1 if worker i is employed in period t, 
0 if worker i is unemployed in period t. 
(4) 
b min is a borrowing limit, c denotes a consumption basket, R is the gross nominal interest rate, and π denotes the net
inﬂation rate. 
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 Let V 
(
b h 
i 
, r i , S 
)
be the expected present discounted utility of a household given its bond holdings, its labor market status,
r i , and the aggregate state vector, S . Employed workers’ Bellman equation is: 
V 
(
b h i , n, S 
)
= max 
c i , b 
h ′ 
i 
{ U ( c i ) + βE 
( 
1 −
∑ 
g= s,l 
ρϕ g 
(
1 − η′ g 
)) 
V 
(
b h ′ i , n, S ′ 
)
+ βE 
∑ 
g= s,l 
ρϕ g 
(
1 − η′ g 
)
V 
(
b h ′ i , g, S ′ 
)} , (5)
subject to the borrowing constraint and to the budget constraint (3) setting n i = 1 . U is an increasing and strictly con-
cave utility function. β∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, and E is the conditional expectations operator. The
terms on the right hand side of (5) are the instantaneous utility ﬂow U ( c i ), the probability of being employed next pe-
riod ( 1 −∑ g= s,l ρϕ g (1 − η′ g )) times its continuation value, and the probability of being state g unemployed next period
( ρϕ g 
(
1 − η′ g 
)
) times the respective continuation values. 
The Bellman equation for a type s unemployed worker is: 
V 
(
b h i , s, S 
)
= max 
c i , b 
h ′ 
i 
{ U ( c i ) + βE ( 1 − ω ) 
[
η′ s V 
(
b h ′ i , n, S ′ 
)
+ 
(
1 − η′ s 
)
V 
(
b h ′ i , s, S ′ 
)]
+ βE ω 
[
η′ l V 
(
b h ′ i , n, S ′ 
)
+ 
(
1 − η′ l 
)
V 
(
b h ′ i , l, S ′ 
)]} , (6)
subject to (2) and (3) setting n i = 0 . A type s unemployed worker remains type s with probability ( 1 − ω ) and makes a
transition to type l with probability ω. Finally, the Bellman equation for a type l unemployed workers is: 
V 
(
b h i , l, S 
)
= max 
c i , b 
h ′ 
i 
{ U ( c i ) + βE 
[
η′ l V 
(
b h ′ i , n, S ′ 
)
+ 
(
1 − η′ l 
)
V 
(
b h ′ i , l, S ′ 
)]} , (7)
subject to (2) and (3) setting n i = 0 . Since w > ξ, V ( b h , n , S ) ≥V ( b h , s , S ) for all b h and S so that no employed household has
an incentive to voluntarily leave their current job. Under the condition that η′ s ≥ η′ l , V ( b h , s , S ) ≥V ( b h , l , S ) for all b h and S . 
The consumption index c i = 
( ∫ 
j 
(
c 
j 
i 
)1 −1 /γ
dj 
)1 / ( 1 −1 /γ ) 
is a basket of consumption goods varieties where c 
j 
i 
is household
i ’s consumption of goods of variety j and γ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods. Household i ’s
demand for variety j is given as: 
c j 
i 
= 
(
P j 
P 
)−γ
c i . (8)
P j is the nominal price of variety j and P = 
( ∫ 
j P 
1 −γ
j 
dj 
)1 / ( 1 −γ ) 
is the price index. 
Entrepreneurs. Consumption goods are produced by a continuum of measure  < 1 of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms
indexed by j ∈ (0, ) owned by risk neutral entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs discount utility at the rate β and in return for
managing (and owning) the ﬁrm, they are the sole claimants to its proﬁts. Entrepreneurs can save but face a no-borrowing
constraint. This no-borrowing constraint implies that the entrepreneur ﬁnances hiring costs through retained earnings. 6 
Output is produced according to a linear technology: 
y j,t = n j,t , (9)
where n j , t denotes entrepreneur j ’s input of labor. Firms hire labor in a frictional labor market. The law of motion for
employment in ﬁrm j is given as: 
n j,t = ( 1 − ρt−1 ) n j,t−1 + ψ t v j,t . (10)
v j , t denotes vacancies posted, and ψ t is the job ﬁlling probability. Firms are suﬃciently large that ψ t can be interpreted as
the fraction of vacancies that leads to a hire. The cost of posting a vacancy is given by μ> 0. Real marginal costs are: 
mc j,t = w t + 
μ
ψ t 
− βE t 
[
( 1 − ρt ) μ
ψ t+1 
]
. (11)
Following Rotemberg (1982) , ﬁrms face quadratic costs of price adjustment. Given risk neutrality, entrepreneurs set prices
to maximize the present discounted value of proﬁts: 
E t 
∞ ∑ 
s =0 
βs 
( (
P j,t+ s 
P t+ s 
−mc j,t+ s 
)
y j,t+ s −
φ
2 
(
P j,t+ s − P j,t+ s −1 
P j,t+ s −1 
)2 
y t 
) 
, (12)
subject to: 
y j,t = 
(
P j,t 
P t 
)−γ
y t . (13)6 In the stationary equilibrium, β < 1 / ( R / ( 1 + π) ) so entrepreneurs will be borrowing constrained. This derives from the assumption that households 
are risk averse while entrepreneurs are assumed risk neutral. 
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 Eq. (13) is the demand for goods variety j . y t , can be interpreted as aggregate real income. φ ≥0 indicates the severity of
nominal rigidities in price setting with φ = 0 corresponding to ﬂexible prices. The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem
is: (
1 − γ + γmc j,t 
P t 
P j,t 
)
y j,t = φ
P t 
P j,t−1 
(
P j,t − P j,t−1 
P j,t−1 
)
y t 
−φβE t 
[(
P j,t+1 
P 2 
j,t 
)(
P j,t+1 − P j,t 
P j,t 
)
P t y t+1 
]
. (14) 
The entrepreneurs’ consumption and savings decisions solve: 
W 
(
b e j , n j , S 
)
= max 
d j , b 
e ′ 
j 
, h j 
{
d j + βE W 
(
b e ′ j , n ′ j , S ′ 
)}
, (15) 
subject to (10) and to: 
d j + b e ′ j + wn j + μ
h j 
ψ 
= P j 
P 
n j − T e + 
R −1 
1 + π b 
e 
j , (16) 
b e ′ j ≥ 0 , (17) 
where d j denotes entrepreneur j ’s consumption and b 
e ′ 
j 
their bond purchases. Condition (17) imposes the no-borrowing
constraint on entrepreneurs. T e denotes a lump-sum tax imposed on employers to cover the government provided unem-
ployment beneﬁts. 
Labor market . We assume that w t = w as long as w is consistent with the joint match surplus being non-negative and
with workers preferring to work rather than being unemployed. 7 We will later investigate the importance of this assump-
tion. 
The matching technology is given as: 
m t =  ( u a,t ) α( v t ) 1 −α, (18) 
where m t denotes the measure of matches at date t , and v t is the aggregate measure of vacancies posted by the ﬁrms.
ϱ> 0, and α ∈ (0, 1) are constant parameters. u a , t is a measure of the number of ‘active’ searchers at the beginning of the
period: 
u a,t = ( ( 1 − ω t−1 ) u s,t−1 + ρt−1 ϕ s,t−1 n t−1 ) + q 
(
u l,t−1 + 
(
ω t−1 u s,t−1 + ρt−1 ϕ l,t−1 n t−1 
))
, (19) 
where u r , t is the measure of type r unemployed workers at date t . Type s unemployed workers search every period while
type l search with probability q ∈ (0, 1]. When q < 1, type l unemployed workers face longer expected unemployment spells
than type s unemployed workers. The vacancy ﬁlling probability and the job ﬁnding probabilities are given as: 
ψ t = θ−αt , (20) 
ηl,t = qηs,t = qθ1 −αt , (21) 
where θt = v t / u a,t denotes labor market tightness. The laws of motion of the stocks of employed and unemployed workers
are given as: 
n t = ( 1 − ρt−1 ) n t−1 + m t , (22) 
u s,t = ( 1 − ηs,t ) ( ( 1 − ω t−1 ) u s,t−1 + ρt−1 ϕ s,t−1 n t−1 ) , (23) 
u l,t = 
(
1 − ηl,t 
)(
u l,t−1 + 
(
ω t−1 u s,t−1 + ρt−1 ϕ l,t−1 n t−1 
))
. (24) 
Government . We assume that the government balances the budget period-by-period: 
u t ξ = T e t , (25) 
where u t = u s,t + u l,t . 
Monetary policy is speciﬁed by a rule for the short-term nominal interest rate: 
R t = R 
(
1 + πt 
1 + π
)δ
, (26) 7 We have checked that the match surplus is positive for all matches in all the results that we report. 
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 where R is the long-run nominal interest rate target, π is the inﬂation target, and δ denotes the (semi-) elasticity of
the nominal interest rate to deviations of inﬂation from its target. In Section 5 we investigate further the role of the
monetary policy rule. 
Stochastic shocks . We allow for shocks to the job separation rate 8 , ρt , and to ϕl , t and ω t , which determine the hetero-
geneity in search eﬃciency. We assume that: 
ρt = ρ + z ρ,t , (27)
ϕ l,t = ϕ l + z ϕ,t , (28)
ω t = ω + z ω,t , (29)
z i ,t = λi z i ,t−1 + ε i ,t , i = ρ, ϕ, ω. (30)
ρ, ϕ l , ω ∈ ( 0 , 1 ) determine the steady-state values of ρ, ϕl , and ω and λρ, λϕ , λω ∈ ( −1 , 1 ) their persistence. We assume
that ε t ∼ N ( 0 , V ε ) where ε t = 
(
ε ρ,t , ε ϕ,t , ε ω,t 
)′ 
. ε ρ, t is assumed orthogonal to ε ϕ, t and ε ω, t while these two latter shocks
may be correlated. 
We take no ﬁrm stand on the sources of the shocks to search eﬃciency, ε ϕ, t and ε ω, t . Hall (2015) argues that the com-
position of job losers during the Great Recession shifted towards those with on average smaller job ﬁnding rates. S¸ ahin et al.
(2014) instead document an increase in occupational and cross-industry “mis-match” between vacancies and job seekers
during the Great Recession. Sterk (2015) suggests that falling house prices may have limited labor mobility during the Great
Recession. Each of these observations would be consistent with a positive innovation to ε ϕ, t . Kroft et al. (2016) instead doc-
ument an increase in negative duration dependence after 2008 as would be consistent with innovations to either ε ϕ, t or
ε ω, t . 
Equilibrium . We focus upon a recursive equilibrium in which workers act competitively taking all prices for given while
ﬁrms act as monopolistic competitors setting the price of their own variety taking all other prices for given. In equilibrium,
ﬁrms will be symmetric because of the absence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, state contingent pricing and because
we assume that they are large enough that job separation and vacancy ﬁlling probabilities can be treated like fractions.
We denote relative prices by p j,t = P j,t / P t . In the symmetric equilibrium p j,t = 1 and the optimal price setting condition
simpliﬁes to: 
1 − γ + γmc t = φπt ( 1 + πt ) − φβE t 
[ 
πt+1 ( 1 + πt+1 ) y t+1 
y t 
] 
. (31)
Models with incomplete markets and aggregate shocks are cumbersome to solve numerically. In this paper we follow
Krusell et al. (2011) and impose that the borrowing constraint b min = 0 . Under this assumption there is no aggregate savings
vehicle available to workers and, in equilibrium, since unemployed workers cannot issue debt, all workers consume their
income every period. Nonetheless, since employed workers face the risk of losing their job, they have an incentive to save
and will therefore be on their Euler equations. 9 For the same reason, although workers cannot save in equilibrium, the
model still features a precautionary savings motive which impacts on equilibrium quantities through the real interest rate.
Given this borrowing constraint, the wealth distribution is degenerate which simpliﬁes the computational aspects of the
model very considerably. In Appendix 8 we show that allowing for individual savings - and therefore for a non-degenerate
wealth distribution - has only limited impact on aggregate dynamics. We deﬁne the equilibrium formally in Appendix 1. 
4. Quantitative results 
4.1. Calibration 
Given the degenerate wealth distribution, we can solve the model numerically using a standard perturbation approach
(see the Appendix for details). Table 1 reports the calibration targets and parameter values. 
A model period corresponds to one month. The household utility function is assumed to be given as: 
U ( c i,t ) = 
c 1 −σ
i,t 
− 1 
1 − σ , σ ≥ 0 . (32)
σ is the degree of relative risk aversion. We set σ = 1 . 5 which is in the mid-range of empirical estimates of Attanasio and
Weber (1995) , Eichenbaum et al. (1988) , and many others. We assume an annual steady-state real interest rate of 5% and8 The job separation rate can be endogenized by e.g. introducing match speciﬁc shocks, see Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . However, we ﬁnd it useful 
to assume exogenous job separations to capture the impact of a variety of different shocks (such as productivity shocks, ﬁnancial shocks, idiosyncratic 
demand shocks). 
9 The equilibrium real interest rate has to be consistent with employed workers’ Euler equation. Strictly speaking, this determines an upper bound on 
the real interest rate, see also Krusell et al. (2011) . 
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Table 1 
Calibration of the Model. 
Steady-state targets Stationary state values 
u 0.05 unemployment rate c n 0.830 consumption employed 
ηs 0.586 job ﬁnding rate among searchers c u,s 0.733 consumption unemployed in s -pool 
μ
ψ4 w 
0.045 hiring cost as fraction of quarterly wage c u,l 0.733 consumption unemployed in l -pool 
0.15 fraction of unemployed ( > 6 months) ηs 0.586 job ﬁnding rate unemployed in s -pool 
ξ
w 
0.117 consumption loss upon unemployment ηl 0.274 job ﬁnding rate unemployed in l-pool 
π 0 net inﬂation rate ( π ) u s 0.017 mass in s -pool 
R 12 − 1 0.05 annual net interest rate u l 0.033 mass in l-pool 
5 avg. price duration (Calvo equivalent) 
Parameter values Parameter values 
φ 96.9 price adjustment cost parameter λϕ 0.99 persistence search heterog. shock l-pool 
γ 6 elast. subst. goods varieties 100 νω / ω 7.20 std. dev. ω shock as a percentage of ω 
β 0.992 discount factor μ 0.19 matching eﬃciency parameter 
σ 1.5 coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion q 0.468 prob. of search for unemployed in l-pool 
δ 1.5 interest rate rule parameter on inﬂation w 0.830 real wage 
ρ 0.039 steady state job termination rate α 0.65 matching function elasticity 
λρ 0.91 persistence termination rate shock ξ 0.733 unemployment beneﬁt 
100 νρ/ ρ 0.667 std. dev. ρ shock as a percentage of ρ R − 1 0.004 steady-state net nominal interest rate 
ϕ l 0.229 s.s. fraction of job losers into s -pool ω 0.219 steady state fraction from s -pool to l -pool 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 set the subjective discount factor equal to 0.992 for both workers and entrepreneurs. This value is low relative to standard
representative agent models 10 but because of idiosyncratic risk and incomplete markets, agents have a strong incentive to
engage in precautionary savings requiring a low real interest rate to induce zero savings in equilibrium. 
We target a steady-state unemployment rate of 5%. The parameters ( q , ϕs , ω) and the steady-state job ﬁnding probability
for type s unemployed workers, ηs , are calibrated by targeting the following moments: First, according to CPS data for the
post 1970 sample, on average 15% of job losers experience unemployment spells of 6 months or more. Secondly, the monthly
hazard rate for the newly unemployed is 43%, see Rothstein (2011) . Third, we introduce information on duration dependence
from ( Kroft et al., 2016 ). These authors assume that the job ﬁnding rate depends on the length of the unemployment spell,
d , and on labor market tightness as: 
ηt 
(
θt , d 
)
= A ( d ) m 0 θ1 −νt , (33) 
A ( d ) = ( 1 − a 1 − a 2 ) + a 1 e −b 1 d + a 2 e −b 2 d . (34) 
Using panel data from the CPS for the 20 02–20 07 sample (and controlling for demographic variables), Kroft et al. (2016) es-
timate ̂  a 1 = 0 . 314 , ̂  a 2 = 0 . 393 , ̂  b 1 = 1 . 085 and ̂  b 2 = 0 . 055 . We target the implied values of the relative hazard, A ( d )/ A (0), for
integer values of d going up to 15 months. 
We ﬁnd that q = 0 . 468 , ϕ l = 0 . 229 , ω = 0 . 219 and ηs = 0 . 586 . Thus, 77% of job losers ﬂow into the high search eﬃciency
state upon job loss and thereafter face a moderate risk of 22% per month of loss of search eﬃciency during unemployment.
Unemployed workers with high search eﬃciency are more than twice as likely to ﬁnd a job (per month) as low search
eﬃciency unemployed workers. In the steady-state, these parameter values imply that the average duration upon job loss
of type s ( l ) unemployed workers is 1.48 months (4.10 months), and that the share of unemployed workers out of work for
6 months or more is 15.9%. The calibration matches closely the hazard function estimated by Kroft et al. (2016) . 11 Finally, to
match the 5% unemployment rate, we set ρ equal to 3.9% per month. 
The beneﬁt level, ξ, is calibrated by targeting a decline in consumption of 11.7% upon unemployment which matches the
average household spending impact of a job loss estimated by Hurd and Rohwedder (2011) . 12 The elasticity of matching
function to unemployment, α, is set equal to 65% and we normalize  = 1 . μ, the vacancy cost parameter, is calibrated by
targeting an average hiring cost of 4.5% of the quarterly wage bill per worker as estimated by Silva and Toledo (2009) . Given
other parameters, this implies that μ = 0 . 19 . 
We set the average mark-up equal to 20% and therefore assume that γ , the elasticity of substitution between goods,
equals 6. φ, which determines the importance of price adjustment costs, is calibrated to match a price adjustment frequency
of 5 months. This value is consistent with the estimates of Bils and Klenow (2004) . 13 This implies that φ = 96.9. The inﬂation10 Recall that we calibrate to monthly data so that the annual discount factor is 0.908 which is low relative to standard calibrations typically assuming 
values around 0.96. 
11 Figure A.1 in the Appendix illustrates the hazard function implied by our model evaluated in the steady-state together with the estimate of Kroft et al. 
(2016) . 
12 See Hurd and Rohwedder (2011) , Table 21. Browning and Crossley (2001) estimate a similar average consumption loss due to unemployment shocks in 
Canadian household data. 
13 To be precise, we calibrate φ by exploiting the equivalence between the log-linearized Phillips curves implied by our model and by the Calvo model. 
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Fig. 3. The impact of job separation shocks. 
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 target is set equal π = 0 so that the central bank pursues price stability and we set δ = 1 . 5 , a conventional value in the new
Keynesian literature. 
Finally, we estimate the parameters of the stochastic processes for ρt , ϕl , t and ω t . The persistence of ρt and the variance
of its innovation are estimated using JOLTS data on layoffs and BLS estimates of the employment rate for a sample ranging
from 2003 to 2014. This implies that ̂  λρ = 0 . 91 and ̂  vρ/ ρ = 0 . 0067 . To estimate the persistence and volatility of ϕl , t and ω t
we use the model to ‘back out’ processes these processes given the estimates of q , ϱ and α, and data on the unemployment
outﬂow rate and labor market tightness. It follows from the matching function that: 
u a,t = u t−1 
(˜ ηt 
 
)1 /α(
v t 
u t−1 
)1 −1 /α
, (35)
where ˜ ηt is the average job ﬁnding rate amongst the stock of unemployed. We further assume proportionality between
ϕl , t and ω t which implies that the disturbances to these two ﬂows are perfectly correlated, i.e. 
ω 
ϕ l 
z ω, t = z ϕ, t . The estimates
of u a , t together with the transition equations ( 23 ) and ( 24 ), can then be applied to derive estimates of ϕs , t and ω t , see
Appendix 3 for details. Using data from JOLTS and the CPS (for the 2003–2014 sample) we ﬁnd ̂  λϕ = ̂  λω = 0 . 99 and ̂  vϕ / ϕ l =
 vω / ω = 0 . 072 . 14 
4.2. Results 
The impact of labor market shocks. We ﬁrst examine the impact of job separation shocks and changes in the composition
of unemployed workers. We compare the benchmark economy with two alternative economies. The ﬁrst of these assumes
that prices are ﬂexible ( φ = 0 ) but retains the incomplete markets assumption. This is informative about the extent to
which nominal rigidities matter. In the second alternative economy individuals can insure against idiosyncratic shocks within
large families but retain nominal rigidities. In this alternative economy there is therefore no precautionary savings against
idiosyncratic risk. The family here maximizes utility subject to the single budget constraint: 
c t + b h t = n t w t + ( 1 − n t ) ξ + 
R t−1 
1 + πt b 
h 
t−1 , t ≥ 0 , (36)
where n t is the fraction of employed household members in period t . 
Fig. 3 illustrates the responses of key aggregate variables to a one standard deviation increase in ρt . Variations in the job
termination rate have only moderate effects in standard matching models because rising unemployment implies declining14 Monthly job openings and layoffs are noisy and we pre-smooth the data using a 6 month moving average ﬁlter. The parameters of the shock processes 
are obtained by regressing the shock variables on their values lagged with one year. We then compute the monthly persistence parameters implied by the 
regressions. 
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Fig. 4. The impact of search heterogeneity shocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 job ﬁlling costs which triggers higher vacancy postings. In the benchmark model we instead ﬁnd that an increase in job
separations produces a large and persistent increase in unemployment in addition to persistent declines in vacancy postings
and in the job ﬁnding rate plus a surge in the share of longer term unemployed workers. 15 
Fig. 4 repeats the analysis for a joint one standard deviations increase in ϕs , t and in ω t . This combination of shocks
decrease average search eﬃciency since more job losers ﬂow into type l unemployment and more existing high search
eﬃciency unemployed workers suffer a loss of search eﬃciency. These shocks also produce a persistent increase in the level
of unemployment and in the share of longer term unemployed workers. Similarly to the job separation shock, the decline
in search eﬃciency leads to a persistent decline in vacancy postings and in the job ﬁnding rate. 
To understand the results it is instructive to consider the Euler equation for employed workers and the ﬁrst order con-
dition for price setting: 
U c ( c 
n ) = βE R 
1 + π′ { 
(
1 − ρ
[
ϕ s 
(
1 − η′ s 
)
+ ( 1 − ϕ s ) 
(
1 − η′ l 
)])
U c 
(
c n ′ 
)
+ ρϕ s 
(
1 − η′ s 
)
U c 
(
c u,s ′ 
)
+ ρ( 1 − ϕ s ) 
(
1 − η′ l 
)
U c 
(
c u,l′ 
)} , (37) 
1 − γ + γ
(
w + μ
ψ 
− βE ( 1 − ρx ) μ
ψ ′ 
)
= φ( 1 + π) π − βφE 
(
1 + π′ 
)
π′ y 
′ 
y 
, (38) 
where c n , c u , s and c u , l denote the consumptions level of an employed worker, a high search eﬃciency unemployed worker
and a low search eﬃciency unemployed worker, respectively, and U c ( c ) = ∂ U ( c ) /∂ c . 
Employed workers are on their Euler equation because they have an incentive to save. Declining search eﬃciency and
worsening job ﬁnding prospects during unemployment stimulate higher desired savings because it implies lower expected
income and because of increased idiosyncratic employment risk. Thus, when labor market conditions worsen, employed
workers’ demand for consumption goods falls at the current real interest rate. This puts downward pressure on the real
interest rate, on inﬂation (since δ > 1) and on nominal interest rates. 
Eq. (38) is the optimal price setting condition in the symmetric equilibrium. Due to nominal rigidities, ﬁrms ﬁnd it 
optimal to phase in changes in the optimal price level gradually over time. In the face of downward pressure on inﬂation,
marginal costs have to decline. Since the real wage is assumed inﬂexible, lower marginal costs come from a decline in the
cost of hiring (requiring vacancies to drop). Thus, fewer jobs are available and this explains the persistent drop in the job15 The increase in job separations produces an initial short-lived drop in the fraction of long-term unemployed workers because of the inﬂow of newly 
unemployed workers. 
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Fig. 5. The Great Recession: shocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ﬁnding rate. It follows that adverse labor market shocks trigger declining goods demand that induces a fall in labor demand.
It is this feedback mechanism from the demand side to the supply side that produces ampliﬁcation. 16 
The ampliﬁcation mechanism depends crucially on the combination of nominal rigidities and lack of insurance against
unemployment. Figs. 5 and 6 also report the impact of the labor market shocks for the two alternative economies described
above. Absent nominal rigidities, price adjustments neutralize the need for a fall in marginal costs and ﬁrms exploit low hir-
ing costs to post more vacancies. The job ﬁnding rate therefore falls only marginally which stops the ampliﬁcation mecha-
nism. Shocks to search heterogeneity increases hiring costs making it costlier to ﬁll vacancies but price ﬂexibility eliminates
the need for a large cut in vacancies. When workers can insure against idiosyncratic employment shocks, changing labor
market conditions no longer impact on idiosyncratic risk and savings are determined by intertemporal considerations. An
increase in the job separation rate has minor effects on expected family income making aggregate demand unresponsive to
changes in the job separation rate. The intertemporal savings motive is also small in the case of shocks to the share of low
eﬃciency searchers. Thus, there is therefore little ampliﬁcation of labor market shocks when households can insure against
idiosyncratic risk. 
The Great Recession . We now examine the extent to which the mechanisms of the model may be important for under-
standing the Great Recession. 17 We derive estimates of the sequences of the shocks, 
(
ε ρ,t , ε ϕ,t , ε ω,t 
)2014:8 
t=2007:1 and feed them
into the model to produce counterfactual experiments. ε ρ , t is estimated by matching the observed U.S. time-series on the
employment-to-unemployment transition rate while ε ϕ, t and ε ω, t are estimated using the same approach as above on the
basis of BLS and JOLTS data by matching the observed matching function residual. In order to avoid having too erratic
shocks, we smooth both data series with a 6 months moving average ﬁlter. 16 Our timing assumptions matter for this feedback mechanism. Assuming alternatively that workers cannot immediately search when losing their jobs 
would impact on the feedback mechanism because the job ﬁnding rate would not appear in (37). However, this is an artefact of the simplifying assumptions 
we have made imposing b min = 0 . Allowing for savings would reinstate the feedback through the savings choice. 
17 In Appendix 5 , we compare the results for the Great Recession with those for the early1990 ′ s recession. 
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 The upper panels of Fig. 5 illustrate the estimated shocks. The Great Recession witnessed a spur of job separations which
started in early 2008, peaked in early 2009, and lasted only until the end of that year. We ﬁnd a drop in search eﬃciency due
to increased heterogeneity which is very persistent. The drop in the average search eﬃciency starts in 2008 and continues
throughout 2009/10 peaking in early 2011 and thereafter slowly diminishes. It is useful to compare this shock to search
heterogeneity with other measures. For that purpose we also illustrate εm , t : 
ε m,t = log 
( [
1 
 
(
m t 
u t−1 
)]1 /α(
v t 
u t−1 
)1 −1 /α) 
. (39) 
εm , t is the matching function residual assuming homogeneous search eﬃciency amongst the unemployed. Similarly to 
Barlevy (2011) we ﬁnd a 40–45% adverse shock to the matching function over the 2007–2011 period and a 20% recovery
thereafter. We also illustrate the fraction of newly unemployed workers who report to have suffered “permanent” job sepa-
rations. As argued by Hall and Sam (2014) , such job losses are associated with low job ﬁnding rates (relative to other types
of job losers) and variations in this fraction therefore reﬂect changes in average search eﬃciency. This fraction increases
from 23% prior to the recession in 2007 to 45% by early 2010. Thereafter it gradually declines towards its pre-recession
level. It therefore mirrors quite precisely the search eﬃciency shock that we estimate. 
Fig. 6 illustrates the impact of the shocks on the level of unemployment, longer term unemployment, and on vacancies.
A key focus of our analysis is whether the model can account for the persistent decline job ﬁnding rate observed in the U.S.
following the ﬁnancial crisis. The answer to this is aﬃrmative: The model reproduces both the timing and the size of the
fall in the job ﬁnding rate and the very persistent nature of the declining job ﬁnding prospects. Fig. 6 also reports the share
unemployed workers out of employment for 6 months (out of total unemployment). The benchmark economy is consistent
with the rise in the incidence of longer term unemployment in the early part of the recession and with the very stubborn
nature of the rise in this labor market indicator. The model, however, is not fully able to account for the size of the rise in
longer term unemployment. Nevertheless, the model does generate a signiﬁcant shift in the composition of the unemployed
towards unemployment states with longer duration. Finally, the bottom left panel of Fig. 6 displays the conditional standard
deviation of income one month ahead for currently employed workers, scaled by the current level of income. 18 This is a
measure of the income uncertainty in the model which partly is endogenous as it depends on the job ﬁnding rate. Income
uncertainty surges during 2008 and remains at an elevated level until 2013, after which it decreases somewhat. Comparing
with the corresponding measure in the economy without nominal rigidities we can evaluate the endogenous component of18 To compute the conditional standard deviations we use a Gauss-Hermite approximation with 36 nodes. We do not plot the uncertainty measure for 
the full insurance version of the model, as it is close to zero throughout the sample. 
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 this uncertainty measure. Income uncertainty rises signiﬁcantly less in the ﬂexible price economy than in the benchmark
model especially in the early part of the recession (the rise in income uncertainty by early 2009 is almost twice as large in
the benchmark economy as in the ﬂexible price version of the model). 
The Beveridge curve implications are also illustrated in Fig. 6 . The counter-clockwise Beveridge curve movements ob-
served during the Great Recession are not unusual during recessions but the current episode is more dramatic than what is
observed during most other recessions. We ﬁnd that the model accounts very accurately for both the movement down the
Beveridge curve that occurred in 20 08–20 09 and the subsequent outward shift of the Beveridge curve for the reasons just
discussed. 
Fig. 6 also displays the paths of the relevant aggregates when we assume that the U.S. economy was hit only by job
separation shocks. In the absence of these shocks, the model accounts for the initial rise in unemployment in late 2008 and
for the initial drop in vacancies but neither for the size nor persistence of the rise in unemployment or for the very long
and deep decline in job vacancies. 
Assuming ﬂexible prices, the labor market shocks leave vacancies almost unaffected. For that reason, the worsening
labor market conditions have little impact on unemployment lead to a very minor rise in the incidence of longer term
unemployment. Perhaps most strikingly, the ﬂexible price model implies an extremely counterfactual horizontal Beveridge
curve. Interestingly, the model with insurance against idiosyncratic shocks generates very similar results to the ﬂexible price
model. Labor market shocks have minor impact on aggregate goods demand in this economy inducing a limited increase
in unemployment, a minor increase in the incidence of longer term unemployment, and a very counterfactual horizontal
Beveridge curve. Hence, the ampliﬁcation mechanism derives from the combination of frictions in goods, labor and ﬁnancial
markets. 
In summary, the model produces substantial ampliﬁcation of labor market shocks and it matches closely the experiences
of the U.S. economy during the Great Recession including the persistent drop in the job ﬁnding rate and the movements
along and outward shift of the Beveridge curve. 
5. Extensions and robustness analysis 
We now investigate three further issues: The importance of the sources of heterogeneity in search eﬃciency amongst the
unemployed; the impact of inﬂexible wages; and the impact of monetary policy. 
Search eﬃciency heterogeneity: ampliﬁcation vs. propagation. We have allowed for heterogeneity in search eﬃciency to
materialize either upon job loss or during an unemployment spell. Heterogeneity in job search eﬃciency upon job loss
impacts on employed workers’ consumption and savings decisions directly, cf. the Euler Eq. 37 , and propagates shocks over
time through the impact on search eﬃciency. Increased risk of loss of search eﬃciency during an unemployment spell in
contrast does not directly inﬂuence employed workers’ savings choices but still propagates shocks through the impact on
search eﬃciency. 
We now investigate these two ﬂows’ importance separately. Fig. 7 repeats the Great Recession experiment from the pre-
vious section assuming either that the probability of search eﬃciency loss during an unemployment spell remains constant
during the Great Recession (and equal to its steady-state value of ω = 21 . 9 % per month) or that ω = 0 so that negative
duration dependence is eliminated altogether. 
Assuming ω t = ω generates results similar to those of the benchmark model indicating that unobserved heterogeneity is
quantitatively much more important than increased negative duration dependence. This is consistent with Ahn and Hamilton
(2016) who - studying CPS data - ﬁnd that recessions are times when there is an increased inﬂow of workers with low job
ﬁnding probabilities into unemployment. Our results go one step further and demonstrate that such a compositional change
is important for the severity of the Great Recession because of its impact on aggregate demand. 
Eliminating negative duration dependence altogether ( ω = 0 ) again delivers results very similar to the benchmark model.
The reason for this is that type s workers in the steady-state only face a minor (13%) risk of experiencing a transition to
state l during an unemployment spell. This risk is too small to matter much quantitatively. Thus heterogeneity in search
eﬃciency upon job loss is much more important for macroeconomic outcomes than negative duration dependence. 
The role of wage ﬂexibility . The assumption of inﬂexible real wages is consistent with the experiences of the Great Reces-
sion (see Figure A.5 which shows average real compensation per hour worked in the Business Sector). We now ask to which
extent do our results depend on this rigidity and whether are there circumstances in which a lack of a fall in real wages
may arise as an equilibrium outcome? 
For this purpose we assume that wages are determined according to a non-cooperative Nash bargaining game between
ﬁrms and workers. Once workers and ﬁrms have been matched (but before a wage has been bargained), we assume that
regardless of the workers’ prior unemployment status, they enter the two unemployment pools with probability ϕs , t and
1 − ϕ l,t , respectively (exactly as an employed worker). This assumption combined with the borrowing constraint, makes
the outcome under Nash bargaining particularly simple because the wage offered to a new worker is independent of their
unemployment state. 
We report results for a wide range of values of the workers’ bargaining power which includes both the calibration of
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) that workers receive 5% of the match surplus to ‘traditional’ values of this parameter of
50%. Fig. 8 illustrates the impact of a job separation shock on unemployment and on real wages. We report the maximum
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 increase in unemployment relative to the corresponding value in the benchmark model. Similarly, we show the maximum
decline in the real wage as a percentage of the steady-state real wage. 19 
Higher bargaining power on the part of workers implies higher wage ﬂexibility in equilibrium and a signiﬁcantly smaller
maximum response of unemployment. Low values of the workers’ bargaining power instead imply similar responses to
labor market shocks to those we found when assuming inﬂexible real wages. To understand this, consider the impact of an
increase in the job separation rate on the joint surplus. A higher job separation rate lowers the value of a ﬁlled job and it
worsens the workers’ outside option because of its impact on the job ﬁnding rate. Hence, the joint match surplus declines
and this puts a downward pressure on real wages which relieves the pressure on ﬁrms to cut vacancy postings. The higher
the workers’ bargaining power, the larger is the fall in real wages and the smaller is the decline in vacancy postings. Whether
the increase in job separations impact mostly on real wages or on vacancy postings matters for employed workers’ savings
choices because the former of these have no impact on the precautionary savings motive and therefore matters for the
ampliﬁcation mechanism. 
The role of monetary policy. It is standard intuition that aggressive responses of nominal interest rates to inﬂation can
neutralize the ineﬃciencies that derive from nominal rigidities while too weak responses to inﬂation produce locally inde-
terminate equilibria. It is unclear whether similar results hold in the heterogenous agents model considered in the current
paper but the strength of the ampliﬁcation mechanism implies that the monetary policy response may potentially be very
important. 
To investigate this issue, Fig. 9 reports the impact of job separation rate shocks on unemployment as a function of two key
parameters, δ and σ . δ determines the response of the nominal interest rate to deviations of inﬂation from its target 20 while
σ determines the extent to which workers respond to employment risk. We indicate by different colors the ampliﬁcation
of the labor market shocks in the benchmark economy by normalizing the maximum impact on unemployment of the job
separation shock with the equivalent response in a ﬂexible price economy. A dark blue color means no ampliﬁcation relative
to the ﬂexible price economy with lighter shades of blue and yellow and orange colors indicating ever increasing degrees of
ampliﬁcation. The white area corresponds to combinations of δ and σ that are inconsistent with local determinacy of the
equilibrium where inﬂation is on target. 
Suﬃciently aggressive monetary policy rules neutralize the ampliﬁcation mechanism while interest rate rules similar to
those typically assumed in the New Keynesian literature produce a large amount of ampliﬁcation. More aggressive mone-19 We assume that workers enjoy leisure when unemployed and calibrate the utility value of leisure so that the steady-state equilibrium real wage implies 
a 5% unemployment rate. 
20 Alternatively, one could allow the policy rule to respond to e.g. the output gap, unemployment or other indicators. The central issue in terms of 
stabilization is whether the rule can stabilize the equilibrium real interest rate around the natural real interest rate (the real interest rate in the ﬂexible 
price equilibrium). 
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Fig. 8. The role of wage ﬂexibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 tary policy responses provide stabilization by moderating the agents’ expectations regarding the impact of the shocks on
equilibrium inﬂation and vacancy postings and thus impact directly on the mechanism through which labor market shocks
are ampliﬁed. 
Our results also show that higher degrees of risk aversion demand more aggressive policy rules in order to provide sta-
bilization. The higher is the degree of risk aversion, the more aggressive rules need to be to ensure local indeterminacy
of the intended equilibrium because risk aversion impacts on precautionary savings. In the indeterminacy region, equilib-
ria can exist in which agents’ expectations of worsening labor market outcomes and low inﬂation drives down aggregate
demand thereby motivating ﬁrms to hire less labor and leading the economy to a high-unemployment-cum-low-inﬂation
self-fulﬁlling equilibria. Thus, the design of the monetary reaction function is critical in the incomplete markets set-up ana-
lyzed in this paper. 
6. Conclusions and summary 
We have shown how frictions in labor markets that interact with goods and ﬁnancial markets frictions can lead to a
signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation of labor market shocks in a general equilibrium framework. At the heart of our theory is the idea
that labor market shocks that produce job uncertainty can reduce aggregate goods demand because of precautionary savings.
A calibrated version of the model can account not only for the increase in unemployment observed in the U.S. during
the Great Recession but also for much of the movements in the Beveridge curve. It is the transmission of weak aggregate
demand to aggregate supply that produces these results because of an endogenous ampliﬁcation mechanism. 
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 Our emphasis on job uncertainty deriving from idiosyncratic employment risk and uncertain outcomes of labor market
search offers an additional route through which macroeconomic uncertainty can impact on the economy. We abstracted from
aggregate savings and imposed that workers cannot go into debt. These assumptions are appealing from a computational
perspective but it would be interesting to relax them both so that one can also evaluate the impact on aggregate savings
and investment. It would also be interesting to investigate the impact of unemployment insurance policies. 
Supplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.07.003 .
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